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Abstract
In representative democracy, voters elect candidates who strategically propose policies. In
a common value environment with imperfectly informed voters and candidates, we establish
that intermediation by candidates can render information aggregation unfeasible even when
a large electorate presented with exogenous options would almost always select the correct
policy. In fact, the possibility of information aggregation encourages candidates’ conformism
and stifles the competition among ideas. Neither liberalizing access to candidacy nor intro-
ducing additional frictions in voters information guarantees feasible information aggregation.
Thus, the political failure we uncover is due to the intermediation by candidates—that is, the
nature of representative democracy.
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1 Introduction
Democracy is commonly defended on the ground that elections tend to successfully aggregate dis-
persed information, thereby protecting societies from policy mistakes (Condorcet, 1785). In modern
democracies, however, citizens do not directly vote on policy. Rather, they elect representatives
who strategically take policy positions. This paper studies, in the context of a common value
environment, whether the desirable properties of direct democracy carry over to representative
democracy.
We establish that in a large representative democracy policy mistakes can happen with posi-
tive probability, even though the same electorate presented with exogenous options would almost
surely select the correct policy. The wisdom of crowd—the possibility of information aggregation—
encourages candidates to converge to the ex-ante welfare-maximizing option for electoral reasons.
Candidates’ strategic conformism then impedes the competition among ideas and renders infor-
mation aggregation unfeasible: with strictly positive probability, the policy will not be socially
optimal. We further show that liberalizing access to candidacy can engender serious coordination
failures among potential candidates, which (paradoxically) reduces the degree of electoral compe-
tition and exacerbates the risk of policy mistake. The novel political failure we uncover is due to
intermediation by candidates, and is thus inherent to representative democracy.
Formally, this paper introduces electoral competition within the set-up of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996), a canonical model of information aggregation in elections. There are two possible policy
options and an ex-ante unknown state of the world which can take one of two values. All voters
prefer the policy to match the realization of the state of the world. Voters can be informed (in
which case they learn the realization of the state) or not (in which case they can only rely on their
prior). Two candidates competing for office also receive either a perfectly informative signal about
the state or no information at all.1
If voters were presented with two distinct policy options, as Feddersen and Pesendorfer estab-
lish, information aggregation would always be guaranteed: the correct policy would be implemented
with probability approaching 1 as the electorate grows large. Our set-up, however, is one of repre-
sentative democracy where the alternatives offered to the electorate depend on the strategic choices
of candidates who value both implementing the correct policy and holding office.
1The assumption that candidates’ signal fully reveals the state guarantees that the implementation of the wrong
policy is not the result of candidates’ ‘honest mistakes.’
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When candidates propose distinct policy options, for all informed voters, it is individually
rational to cast a ballot for the candidate offering the correct policy. When candidates converge,
in turn, we assume that voters are swayed by a random symmetric valence shock (i.e., toss a fair
coin). Given voters’ behavior, we first establish that in a large electorate there is no equilibrium
in which candidates propose divergent policies. An informed candidate who promises the wrong
policy would rather offer the correct option for electoral reasons (he is almost certain to lose the
election otherwise) as well as policy reasons (he suffers a cost when he wins). This failure to sustain
divergence is not necessarily bad for voters: convergence can result from both candidates observing
the state and committing to the optimal policy. But candidates are not always informed, and their
behavior when uninformed is critical for the feasibility of information aggregation.
Information aggregation requires candidates to propose divergent policies when uninformed
about the realized state of the world. But is it in the interest of an uninformed candidates to
behave this way? The answer depends on the balance between electoral incentives and the payoff
loss associated with implementing the wrong policy. If one policy option is ex-ante more likely
to be correct (henceforth, the ‘ex-ante popular policy’), the candidate proposing the unpopular
option can improve his electoral chances by switching policy. This deviation, however, comes at
a cost: the possibility of a policy mistake when both candidates are uninformed and the ex-ante
less likely state of the world is realized. If electoral incentives are strong enough, uninformed
candidates nevertheless converge to the ex-ante popular policy, thereby rendering information
aggregation unfeasible. In any equilibrium (in particular, whether or not voters play a symmetric
voting strategy conditional on divergence), the probability that the correct policy is implemented
is bounded away from one regardless of the electorate’s size.
Our theoretical results uncover a novel form of political failure. The possibility of information
aggregation can paradoxically stifle competition among ideas by encouraging excessive conformism
among candidates. As some policy options are no longer proposed, information aggregation be-
comes unfeasible in equilibrium. In two extensions of our baseline setting, we ask whether facil-
itating access to candidacy or reducing voter information can restore the role of elections as a
“marketplace of ideas.”
In our first extension, we show that removing restrictions on candidacy does not guarantee
that the correct policy is always offered to the electorate. Far from it. The presence of electoral
institutions (such as parties or primaries) limiting access to candidacy can benefit voters. By
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providing benefits from office, parties can avoid the “volunteer dilemma,” whereby all citizens
want the correct policy to be implemented, but everyone would like someone else to run for office
and bear the associated cost. But even when citizens enjoy a net benefit from holding office, parties
can be helpful in coordinating entry and increasing the chances that informed citizens run on the
correct policy. Finally, we show that the possibility of third candidate entry in the presence of
two established parties can also impede information aggregation by reducing the cost of policy
mistake, and thus increasing the relative benefit of conformism. Our paper thus uncovers a novel
normative argument for delegating candidate selection to strong parties.
In our second extension, we consider voters who imperfectly observe not only the state of the
world, but also candidates’ platforms (consistent with evidence in, e.g., Campbell et al., 1980;
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Restricting attention to voter symmetric strategies, we establish
that our results continue to hold as long as a voter cannot fully infer candidates’ platforms from
her knowledge of the state (e.g., candidates make mistakes with arbitrarily small probability).
As in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), voters who do not observe the state abstain in order
to minimize the risk of a policy mistake and let well-informed voters decide the outcome of the
election. But so do voters who observe the state realization but not the platforms. Rather than
being afraid of picking the wrong policy, they fear voting for the wrong candidate (i.e., whose
policy does not match the state). As a result, only voters who observe the state and (at least)
one platform cast a vote, and candidates’ electoral incentives remain unchanged compared to the
baseline model.2
Our two extensions combined stress that the unfeasibility of information aggregation is due to
the nature of representative democracy (intermediation by candidates), rather than errors on the
part of the electorate.
Our work builds upon and is connected to a large body of work on electoral institutions.
Starting with Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), an important game-theoretic literature has exam-
ined whether information can be aggregated in large electorates. Several scholars consider private
value environments in which voters have divergent policy preferences (e.g., Castanheira, 2003a,b;
Gu¨l and Pesendorfer, 2009; Meirowitz and Shotts, 2009; Myatt, 2016; Acharya, 2016). In these
papers, the main question is of full information equivalence: is the majority’s decision the same
with perfect and imperfect information? Due to the conflict of interests between voters, infor-
2Given our equilibrium restriction to symmetric voting strategies, this result, however, should be seen as a lower
bound suggesting that reducing voter information is, at worst, inconsequential.
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mation equivalence is not guaranteed, especially when voters’ evaluation of a policy is different
conditional on receiving the same information (Bhattacharya, 2013a,b; Ali et al., 2017).
This paper, instead, considers a common value environment: all voters agree ex-post on the
correct policy. Several important contributions have shown that a large electorate almost always
selects the right policy when faced with exogenous options (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997;
Wit, 1998; Myerson, 1998; McMurray, 2012) and no second-order uncertainty (Mandler, 2012). In
particular, a sufficient condition, satisfied in our setting, is that the signal and policy spaces have
the same cardinality (Barelli et al., 2017).3
A few papers incorporate strategic politicians in common value environments. Razin (2003)
and McMurray (2017b) show that when candidates can adjust their policies after observing vote
tallies, information aggregation is feasible only if politicians share voters’ preferences.4 Battaglini
(2017) shows that this problem is especially acute when the decision-maker cannot commit to a
decision-rule and voter information is noisy. Our set-up is immune to these issues, since candidates’
policy preferences coincide with voters’ and informed voters can perfectly observe the state.
An important feature of our model is that candidates strategically propose their platforms
ex-ante, rather than adjusting their policy as a function of the electoral results. With a single
strategic proposer, Bond and Eraslan (2010) show that by inducing more moderation, unanimity
can be more beneficial for voters than majority rule. In a setting with electoral competition,
Martinelli (2001) and Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) highlight how voter information can
discipline politicians with distinct preferences than the electorate’s.5 In contrast, Kartik et al.
(2015) shows that office-motivated candidates tend to posture and over-react to their information
when voters can only rely on their prior. Our results, instead, establish that candidates with the
same policy preferences as voters’ become too conformist because of the possibility of information
aggregation.
3With exogenous options, as Piketty (2000) establishes, information aggregation may nonetheless fail whenever
the electorate must vote in multiple elections as voters use the first election to coordinate electoral decisions in the
second election. Lohmann (1994), however, shows that costly political actions can serve as a coordination device
then.
4In a similar vein, Shotts (2006) highlights that when there are multiple elections, voters can induce candidates’
moderation in the second election by choosing the appropriate voting strategy (including abstention) in the first
election. Aytimur and Bruns (2015) show that a large electorate is able to aggregate information to encourage more
effort from an incumbent in a principal-agent setting.
5Gu¨l and Pesendorfer (2009) shows that the electorate may not be able to discipline politicians when voters do
not always learn candidates’ platforms. However, only one candidate is strategic in their setting.
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Closest to our approach are Gratton (2014) and McMurray (2017a). Both find that electoral
competition benefits an imperfectly informed electorate. Gratton (2014) establishes that well-
informed candidates provide higher welfare relative to direct democracy, owing to politicians’ ability
to pick the right policy among many alternatives. McMurray (2017a) finds that poorly informed
candidates always provide voters with a meaningful choice among a continuum of policy options
when states of the world are symmetrically distributed. Because our interest lies in information
aggregation (which is less easily defined in settings with a continuum of policy options), we restrict
our analysis to a binary policy space and show that the positive effects of electoral competition
that these authors document are not robust to imperfectly informed candidates and asymmetrically
distributed states of the world.6
The paper proceeds as follows. The next Section describes the model. Section 3 contains
our main results on information aggregation when candidates have the same policy preferences
as voters’, but also care about holding office. Section 4 discusses our extensions on access to
candidacy and voter information. Section 5 concludes. Proofs for Section 3 are in the Appendix.
All remaining proofs and additional extensions are collected in an Online Appendix.7
2 Model
The game features an electorate composed of 2n + 1 citizens and two candidates (A and B)
competing for an elected office. Candidate J ∈ {A,B} chooses a platform xJ ∈ {0, 1}. Each
citizen i ∈ N has a chance to make an electoral decision ai ∈ {φ,A,B}, where φ denotes abstention
and J ∈ {A,B} a vote for J . The impact of platform xJ depends on the realization of an
underlying state of the world z ∈ {0, 1}, picked by Nature at the beginning of the game. We
assume that policy 0 is ex-ante unpopular and 1 ex-ante popular: the common knowledge prior
satisfies Pr(z = 0) = α < 1/2.
We suppose that all citizens share the same policy preference (i.e., we focus on a common value
environment when it comes to the electorate): all want the policy choice to match the realization
6Information aggregation is always feasible in our baseline setting when politicians are always informed or the
states are symmetrically distributed, in line with Gratton’s and McMurray’s results. We expect our logic to hold
in their set-ups provided the notion of information aggregation can be extended to a continuum of policy options.
More generally, a version of our results hold for any finite set of policy options. We focus on binary alternative to
simplify the analysis and the comparison with direct democracy.
7Available at the following link: goo.gl/UAhGbF
6
of the state. Citizen i’s preferences can then be represented by the following utility function:
U(x, z) =


0 if x = z
−1 if x 6= z
(1)
As in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), we assume that citizen i is selected by Nature to vote
with probability 1 − pφ (pφ corresponds, e.g., to the probability of being sick on the day of the
vote). Henceforth, we refer to selected citizens as voters. This assumption guarantees that a voter
is always pivotal with strictly positive probability for any finite n.
Candidates share voters’ policy preferences, but also value holding office. Formally, candidate
J ’ utility function assumes the following form:
UJ(x, z, e) =


ω + (1− ω)U(z, x) if e = J
(1− ω)U(z, x) otherwise
, (2)
where e denotes the identity of the elected candidate and ω ∈ [0, 1] captures the extent of candi-
dates’ office motivation relative to their policy payoff.
After the realization of the state of the world z, citizens and candidates receive a signal of z.
Before choosing his platform xJ , candidate J ∈ {A,B} observes a message mJ ∈ M := {∅, 0, 1}.
Similarly, citizen i receives a message mi ∈ M before being selected by Nature and eventually
making her electoral decision. Message m ∈ {0, 1} fully reveals the realized state of the world—
Pr(z = y|m = y) = 1, y ∈ {0, 1}—, whereas message m = ∅ is completely uninformative—
Pr(z = 0|m = ∅) = α. All messages are independently drawn conditional on the realized state
of the world. It is common knowledge that candidate J is informed with probability π ∈ (0, 1)—
Pr(mJ = ∅) = 1− π—and citizen i is informed with probability q ∈ (0, 1)—Pr(mi = ∅) = 1− q.
To summarize the timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws z ∈ {0, 1};
2. Candidate J ∈ {A,B} privately observes his signal mJ ∈M . He then chooses xJ ∈ {0, 1};
3. Citizen i ∈ N observes mi ∈ M , and (xA, xB) ∈ {0, 1}
2. She is then selected to vote with
probability 1− pφ, and if so makes her electoral decision ai ∈ {φ,A,B}. Otherwise, she does
not vote;
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4. The candidate who receives the most votes is elected (with ties decided by a fair coin toss)
and implements his platform;
5. The game ends and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE). We impose two additional
refinements. First, we assume that voters receive a negligible (and unmodeled) symmetric valence
shock determining their electoral decision when indifferent. This assumption is equivalent to voters
randomizing uniformly between candidates when the latter converge to the same policy.8
Second, we assume that both candidates face an arbitrarily small probability of mistake δ > 0
(i.e., with probability δ, J proposes y ∈ {0, 1} when his strategy prescribes x 6= y). This refinement
is close in spirit to trembling hands with an important caveat: we do not take the limit of δ to
0.9 This restriction implies that, whatever their prescribed strategies, candidates’ platforms never
fully reveal the state and thus leave a role for information aggregation by the electorate. It also
guarantees that an equilibrium exists for all parameter values even after restricting voters’ strategy.
Importantly, the possibility of mistake plays no role in establishing the unfeasibility of information
aggregation with strategic candidates.
In what follows, the term ‘equilibrium’ refers to PBE satisfying these two additional require-
ments. Unlike the rest of the literature, we generally dispense with the assumption of symmetric
voting strategies (conditional on information and candidates’ divergence) and only impose this re-
striction for some auxiliary results, in which case we explicitly refer to voter-symmetric equilibria.
Throughout the paper, we make use of the following notation. In a size 2n + 1 electorate, for
each candidate J , a pure strategy is a mapping xnJ : M → {0, 1}. A mixed strategy is denoted by
γnJ : {0, 1} ×M → ∆[{0, 1}]. For each voter i, a pure strategy is a mapping a
n
i : M × {0, 1}
2 →
{φ,A,B} and a mixed strategy is denoted by τni : {φ,A,B} ×M × {0, 1}
2 → ∆[{∅, A, B}]. A
tuple of strategies takes the form γn := (γnA, γ
n
B) for candidates and τ
n = {τni }
2n+1
i=1 for voters. In
what follows, we say that a candidate follows his signal if xnJ (m) = m ∈ {0, 1}, J ∈ {A,B} and
8This assumption guarantees that voters are unable to coordinate conditional on convergence. Our main con-
clusion no longer holds when voters can play coordinated strategies (see Online Appendix B.2). As extensively
discussed in Online Appendix B.3, coordinated voters’ behavior requires perfect indifference, whereas our results
continue to hold substantively if voting behavior is affected by any kind of additional non-policy considerations.
9Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016) also assume that candidates make mistakes to generate rational inattention in
probabilistic voting models. Alternatively, we could have assumed that voters face a small probability of mis-
perceiving candidates’ platforms. In our extensions, however, we choose another approach to introduce frictions in
voter information about candidates’ actions.
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an informed voter follows her signal if she votes for the candidate proposing the correct policy
conditional on divergence (the definition is vacuous when candidates’ platforms converge).
We now introduce our notion of information aggregation by adapting Battaglini’s (2017) defini-
tion to our setting. Let Pr(x, z; γn, τn, δ) be the probability that policy x ∈ {0, 1} is implemented
in state z ∈ {0, 1} when candidates play strategy profile γn, voters play strategy profile τn in an
electorate of size 2n + 1, and the probability of mistake is δ. The probability that the correct
policy is implemented is then:
Q(γn, τn, δ) = αPr(0, 0; γn, τn, δ) + (1− α)Pr(1, 1; γn, τn, δ).
Definition 1. Information aggregation is feasible if and only if for all ǫ > 0, there exists δ(ǫ) > 0
and a sequence of equilibria {γn, τn}∞n=0 such that limn→∞Q(γ
n, τn, δ(ǫ)) > 1− ǫ.
Notice that Definition 1 only requires the existence of a sequence of equilibria in which the prob-
ability that the policy outcome matches the state-contingent optimum converges to 1. We naturally
extend the definition by stating that information aggregation is feasible for the sequence of equilib-
ria {γ˜n, τ˜n}∞n=0 if and only if all ǫ > 0, there exists δ(ǫ) > 0 such that limn→∞Q(γ˜
n, τ˜n, δ(ǫ)) > 1−ǫ.
Before proceeding to the analysis, two remarks are in order. First, our approach can be under-
stood as introducing representative democracy into Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s (1996) framework
(with no partisan voters): policy options are endogenous to candidates’ choices.10 This provides
a clear baseline and a clean interpretation for our findings. As Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)
establish, when voters are presented with two exogenous and distinct alternatives, information
aggregation is feasible. Departures from this result can only be attributed to the intermediation
by candidates. In addition, the assumption that informed candidates perfectly learn the state of
the world stacks the model against finding that information aggregation is unfeasible, relative to
a setting with noisy information.11
Second, the model allows candidates to have access to better information than the average
citizen (i.e., we can have π > q). This assumption captures a variety of political institutions (e.g.,
10Partisan voters can only impede information aggregation, and so their presence could only reinforce our main
result.
11If candidates received a noisy signal of the realization of the state of the world, there would be a risk of
candidates’ honest mistakes: both candidates propose the same mistaken platform while following their signal
(details available upon request). Not so much in our set-up: as long as at least one candidate is informed and
follows his signal, information aggregation is guaranteed.
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parties, primaries) that, in practice, are responsible for supporting and screening candidates. We
discuss the role of these institutions in greater detail in Section 4.
3 Electoral incentives and information aggregation
As noted above, if voters are presented with distinct alternatives, information aggregation is fea-
sible. We therefore first ask whether candidates have electoral incentives to propose divergent
platforms (i.e., xA(mA) 6= xB(mB) for all (mA, mB) ∈ M
2) thereby decentralizing information ag-
gregation to the electorate. Our first result establishes that if information aggregation is feasible,
it must be that informed candidates must follow their signals.
Proposition 1. In any sequence of equilibria for which information aggregation is feasible, there
exists ninf such that for all n ≥ ninf , the platform choice of a candidate J ∈ {A,B} satisfies:
xJ (m) = m for m ∈ {0, 1}.
To understand this result, suppose that A receives message m = 1. Candidate A prefers x = 1
to x = 0 for electoral and policy reasons. From an electoral perspective, in a large electorate his
winning probability when proposing xA = 1 is at least 1/2 (strictly higher whenever B proposes
0 with positive probability, since the electorate aggregates information), whereas it is at most 1/2
when proposing xA = 0 (strictly lower if B proposes 1 with positive probability). From a policy
perspective, in a large electorate, the probability of a policy mistake is almost zero when proposing
xA = 1 (due to the feasibility of information aggregation), whereas A would suffer a policy loss
whenever he wins the election after proposing xA = 0.
A direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that in a large electorate divergent platforms cannot
be part of an equilibrium whenever information aggregation is feasible. Equilibria with strategic
candidates are thus qualitatively distinct from the ones arising in set-ups with exogenous policy
options.
Corollary 1. In any sequence of equilibria for which information aggregation is feasible, there
exists ninf such that for all n ≥ ninf in equilibrium candidates do not propose divergent platforms.
Corollary 1 indicates that intermediation by candidates reduces the competition among ideas
in elections. However, this is not necessarily detrimental for the electorate. In fact, fully divergent
platforms are not incentive compatible because informed candidates have too much incentive to act
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on their knowledge of the realized state of the world. This tends to benefit voters: with probability
at least π2(1 − δ)2, both candidates offer the correct policy. To understand whether information
aggregation is feasible, we need to consider all candidates’ strategy profiles ; some of them could be
better for the electorate than divergent platforms.
Our next result establishes that even after considering all candidates’ strategy profiles and
voters’ electoral decisions conditional on divergence, full information aggregation is not always
feasible.
Proposition 2. Information aggregation is feasible if and only if
ω
1− ω
<
2α
1− 2α
(1− π). (3)
Information aggregation is feasible only if uninformed candidates offer divergent platforms with
probability one (otherwise, there is a strictly positive probability that they converge to the wrong
policy, which leads to a violation of Definition 1). Proposition 2 establishes that this behavior is
not always incentive compatible in a large electorate.
To make sense of Equation 3, suppose without loss of generality that for n large enough,
xnA(∅) = 0 and x
n
B(∅) = 1 (recall that by Proposition 1, x
n
J(m) = m, J ∈ {A,B}, m ∈ {0, 1}). By
choosing xA = 0, as n goes to infinity, an uniformed A has a chance of winning only if z = 0: with
probability 1 when candidate B offers platform xB = 1 (probability α(1−π)) and with probability
1/2 when B learns the state and also chooses platform xB = 0 (probability απ). This results in an
overall expected winning probability of α[(1−π)+π/2]. When he deviates to xA = 1, an uninformed
A wins with probability 1/2 only when B also chooses xB = 1, which occurs when either the state
is z = 1 (probability 1−α) or when the state is z = 0 but B is uninformed (probability α(1− π)).
This results in a higher expected winning probability: (1−α)/2+α(1−π)/2. The electoral benefit
of deviating to xA = 1 is thus
(
1
2
− α
)
ω.
However, this deviation also carries a risk of having the wrong policy implemented, which
occurs when the state is z = 0 and B is uninformed (probability α(1 − π)). The expected policy
loss is then α(1−π)(1−ω). Combining the two, we obtain that information aggregation is feasible
if and only if the cost of policy mistake dominates the electoral benefit of proposing xA = 1:(
1
2
− α
)
ω < α(1−π)(1−ω). Simple rearranging then yields the condition in Proposition 2. When
11
Equation 3 does not hold, uninformed candidates have too much incentives to be conformist and
propose the ex-ante popular policy x = 1.12
A direct implication of Proposition 2 is that information aggregation is never feasible with
purely office-motivated candidates (ω = 1). Electoral incentives work through office-motivation.
When candidates only care about winning, the best way to achieve their objective is to be con-
formist and propose the ex-ante popular alternative. As in a Downsian framework with uncertainty
over voters’ preferences (Bernhardt et al., 2009), candidates’ policy motivation is critical for the
well-functioning of representative democracy.
Corollary 2. When ω = 1, information aggregation is never feasible.
We next consider equilibria when information aggregation is unfeasible (i.e., Equation 3 does
not hold). As in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), we restrict attention to symmetric voting
strategies. Observe that voters can never infer the state from proposed platforms, since candidates
make mistakes with small but positive probability. Uninformed voters always face the risk of mak-
ing an electoral mistake after conditioning on the event that they are pivotal. To avoid this, they
abstain and delegate electoral decision-making to the informed voters in a large electorate: absten-
tion by uninformed—commonly referred to as the swing voter’s curse (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996)—holds in our setting (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix for a formal statement and proof).
Consequently, the probability that the correct policy is chosen goes to 1 conditional on divergence.
Anticipating voters’ behaviors and its consequences, uninformed candidates have too much
incentive to behave with conformity in a large electorate. As a result, for high enough n the unique
voter-symmetric equilibrium features uninformed candidates proposing the ex-ante popular policy
x = 1 (i.e., xnA(∅) = x
n
B(∅) = 1), whereas informed candidates follow their signal (i.e., x
n
J (m) = m,
J ∈ {A,B}m ∈ {0, 1}).13 Our analysis thus establishes a lower bound on the quality of information
aggregation. While not always guaranteed, in the limit the correct policy is implemented whenever
12Observe that when the state is distributed uniformly (α = 1/2), full information aggregation is always feasible
as in McMurray (2017a).
13The assumption that candidates make mistakes with probability δ is essential for the existence of a voter-
symmetric equilibrium for sufficiently large n. Absent mistake, in the strategy profile described in the text, platform
x = 0 fully reveals the state is z = 0. In this case, uninformed voters have a dominant strategy to vote for the
candidate proposing x = 0, which in turns creates an incentive for uninformed candidates to deviate from their
prescribed strategies and choose x = 0 (if q < 1 − q, a candidate proposing x = 0 against an opponent proposing
x = 1 is certain to win the election as n→∞ regardless of the state). Equilibrium existence then is not guaranteed
for all parameter values. Introducing mistakes eliminates this problem for large enough electorates. An equilibrium
may not exist only for relatively small n. In that case, we can assume that the electorate is sufficiently large to
begin with to reestablish the result. Since we are concerned with information aggregation or lack thereof in the
limit, this is with little loss of generality.
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at least one candidate is informed. As a result, the quality of equilibrium electoral decision-making
is strictly increasing with π.
Corollary 3. If ω
1−ω
< 2α
1−2α
(1−π), in the unique voter-symmetric sequence of equilibria, the limit
probability that the correct policy is implemented is strictly increasing with π.
Combining Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, our analysis highlights that a large probability that
candidates are informed (π) is a mixed blessing for the electorate (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
On the one hand, fixing candidates’ equilibrium behaviors, the probability that the correct policy is
implemented increases with π (since informed candidates propose the correct policy in equilibrium).
On the other hand, a high π reduces the policy loss associated with deviation and thus encourages
conformism by uninformed candidates (the condition for information aggregation to be feasible
becomes tighter).14 Due to this second effect, an increase in π can lead to a significant decrease in
voters’ expected utility, an affine transformation of the probability of policy mistake. For example,
in Figure 1, the probability that the correct policy is implemented in the limit of a voter-symmetric
sequence of equilibria is 99% when π tends to 0 and approximately 92% when π = 0.5, a drop of
around 6.5%.
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Figure 1: Probability the correct policy is implemented in the limit
The figure represents probability the correct policy is implemented (Q(γn, τn, δ)) as n goes to infinity in voter-
symmetric equilibria. Parameter values α = 0.3, ω = 0.5, δ = 0.01.
14Using the proof of Corollary 3, it can further be checked that information aggregation is feasible when candidates
are always informed (pi = 1) in line with results in Gratton (2014).
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4 Access to candidacy and voter information
The previous section establishes that in representative democracy, electoral incentives encourage
candidates’ conformism, which can stifle competition among ideas and render information aggre-
gation unfeasible. Our baseline model, however, essentially assumes a duopoly (i.e., two parties) in
the supply of candidates. Party control over access to candidacy, we assumed, can improve choice
over an individual citizen’s wisdom (if π > q), but does not fully eliminate the need for elections
(π < 1). In our first extension, we study whether liberalizing access to candidacy can restore the
competition among ideas and thus information aggregation. In a second, extension we consider
whether reducing voters’ information can reduce candidates’ incentive to be conformist. Online
Appendix A contains the formal analysis of both extensions and all proofs.
Access to candidacy
Our baseline framework presupposes the presence of political institutions that perform two roles:
they restrict entry to two candidates, and they (possibly) provide benefits from office. In this
subsection, we discuss whether the political failure we uncover in Proposition 2 is resolved when
we liberalize access to candidacy.
Consider first a setting in which candidacy is fully decentralized. Building on citizen-candidate
models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997), we assume that each citizen simul-
taneously decides whether to run at cost c ∈ (0, 1) after observing her message m ∈ M . While
citizens in traditional citizen-candidate approaches are ideologically differentiated, in this model,
all citizens agree ex-post on the correct policy (see Equation 1). As a consequence, the entry
game resembles a volunteer’s dilemma: each voter wants the correct policy to be implemented,
but would prefer somebody else to run. Volunteer games have well-known properties. In any se-
quence of symmetric equilibria, the probability at least one citizen runs is strictly decreasing with
the size of the electorate (even after restricting entry to informed citizens). Far from encouraging
competition, liberalizing entry may deplete the marketplace of ideas.
We further show that focusing on asymmetric equilibria—in which a few citizens are “desig-
nated” to run—cannot fully resolve the issue. Indeed, unlike a classical volunteer’s dilemma where
one volunteer suffices, information aggregation is feasible only if two citizens enter. But the citizen
assigned to propose the ex-ante unpopular policy has little incentive to do so if uninformed since
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he always pays the cost c > 0, but is pivotal for information aggregation only if the state is z = 0;
that is, only with probability α < 1/2.
The analysis thus reveals that the benefit of holding office—at the core of the political failure
we identify (Corollary 2)—is also key to encourage entry and permit information aggregation. An
intrinsically valuable office, however, is not sufficient. There is no sequence of equilibria in which
all informed voters run with probability one as the electorate grows large. An informed citizen
always pays the cost of entry, but his probability of winning the valuable office tends to zero as n
approaches infinity (in addition, the cost of not running in term of policy mistakes also tends to
zero). In any symmetric equilibrium, informed voters must thus randomize between entering and
staying out. But an informed citizen is then willing to enter only if the risk of policy mistake is non
null. Hence, the existence of any symmetric equilibrium with positive probability of entry requires
information aggregation to be unfeasible. In turn, benefits from office facilitate (in the sense of set
inclusions), but do not guarantee information aggregation when a subset of citizens are designated
to be candidates. In particular, these benefits must not be too high, or they risk encouraging too
many entrants and generating the same coordination problem as in symmetric equilibria.
By offering rents from office and favoring coordination, political institutions that restrict entry
(e.g., parties’ monopoly on candidates’ supply) may benefit rather than hurt the electorate. But
should entry be limited to two candidates? Or would it be beneficial to allow for third candidate
entry (a best case scenario by the reasoning above)? In a third extension, we show that partially
liberalized access to candidacy—a possibly informed politician C chooses whether to run (at a cost
c) after A and B commit to their platforms—has ambivalent effect on information aggregation.
When the cost of entry is very low, C always enters and information aggregation is always feasible.
When it is intermediate, C’s presence can actually render information aggregation harder to achieve
(i.e., the condition for feasible information aggregation is more stringent than Equation 3), by
reducing the likelihood of a policy mistake when A and B converge to the ex-ante popular policy.
In summary, liberalizing access to candidacy is not a panacea to restore competition among
ideas. While directly responsible for the political failure we uncover, political institutions that
provide a benefit from office and restrict entry to two candidates may nonetheless improve the per-
formance of elections as a marketplace of ideas. They serve to facilitate coordination on designated
candidates and to guarantee that some candidates may actually run. Our paper thus provides a
novel normative rationale for delegating candidate selection to strong parties.
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Imperfectly observed platforms
In this subsection, we investigate whether additional imperfections in voter information can reduce
(uninformed) candidates’ incentives to play conformist strategies. We assume that voters do not
necessarily observe what policy candidates stand for, in line with decades of survey evidence (e.g.,
Campbell et al., 1980; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
Formally, we assume that before making her electoral decision, each voter observes two mes-
sages: (i) m ∈ M and (ii) r ∈ {(∅, ∅), (∅, xB), (xA, ∅), (xA, xB)}. The first message m reveals
the state z if m 6= ∅ and has similar properties as in the baseline set-up. The second message
r = (rA, rB) fully reveals the platform of candidate J ∈ {A,B} if and only if rJ 6= ∅. We assume
that platform learning is i.i.d. across voters and satisfies: Pr(rJ = xJ ) = p ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {A,B}
(the baseline model has p = 1).
Even when a voter does not observe xJ , she updates about candidates’ behavior from her
knowledge of the state. As such, partially informed voters who observe m = z, but not (xA, xB)
may have an incentive to vote for the candidates more likely to propose x = z. This, in turn, can
encourage uninformed candidates to propose divergent platforms. The candidate proposing the
ex-ante unpopular policy would have less to gain from offering the more likely option as he would
never be able to earn the votes of partially informed voters in the likely state z = 1.
Alas, when voters play a symmetric voting strategy the profile discussed above does not arise
in equilibrium in a large electorate. The reason is that all partially informed voters abstain. Due
to the probability of mistakes δ > 0, for any candidates’ strategy profile, voters who observe the
state but not platforms do not know which candidate promises the right policy. They thus fear
choosing the wrong candidate and prefer to delegate electoral decision-making to more informed
voters (who both observe the state and at least one platform), much like those voters who observe
platforms but not the state.15
As the election is decided by voters who observe the state and what candidates stand for,
candidates face the exact same incentives as in the baseline model. As a result, uninformed
candidates prefer conformity whenever the electoral benefit of proposing the ex-ante popular policy
dominates its potential policy cost.
15We show in the proof of Lemma A.5 in Online Appendix A that abstention is the unique voter-symmetric
equilibrium strategy for n large enough.
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Proposition 3. There exists a sequence of voter-symmetric equilibria for which information ag-
gregation is feasible if and only if Equation 3 holds.
Observe that in this section, we only establish our unfeasibility result for the most-studied—
and arguably more natural—case of voter-symmetric strategies. We cannot exclude that (relatively
complex) asymmetric voting strategies may improve the feasibility of information aggregation. In
addition, the possibility of candidates’ mistakes plays a key role. It implies that voters who only
observe m = z have a dominant strategy to abstain. However, it also indicates that non-abstention
by these voters is fragile; it requires that voters are absolutely certain of what candidates propose,
even without observing their platforms—arguably, a strong assumption. Nonetheless, in light of
these two caveats, Proposition 3 should be interpreted as a lower bound on the unfeasibility of
information aggregation in electoral setting with strategic candidates and low voter information.16
Worsening voters’ ability to observe candidates’ platforms cannot exacerbate the political fail-
ure that this paper identifies. The unfeasibility of information aggregation is due to candidates’
behaviors, not voters’ political knowledge.
5 Conclusion
This paper uncovers a novel political failure of representative democracy. In an environment
in which elections would aggregate dispersed information if the electorate were presented with
exogenous policy options, we show that the risk of policy mistake can be bounded away from
zero when candidates strategically choose their policy commitments. When candidates’ office-
motivation is large relative to the policy cost of implementing the wrong policy, the wisdom of the
crowd—the possibility of information aggregation—encourages uninformed candidates to converge
to the ex-ante popular policy. Candidates’ excessive conformism then impedes the competition
among ideas and renders information aggregation unfeasible.
In extensions, we establish that liberalizing access to candidacy or reducing voter information
cannot generally restore competition among ideas. When it comes to information aggregation, the
fundamental issue of representative democracy is not that entry is restricted to two candidates—if
anything, this may benefit the electorate—or that voters are poorly informed. The fundamental
16We expect that our main conclusion continues to hold when voters receive noisy signals or need to pay a cost to
acquire information. As others have shown (see Martinelli, 2006; Szentes and Koriyama, 2009), these assumptions
are of no or only limited consequences for information aggregation whenever the electorate is presented with two
distinct exogenous options.
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issue is that the set of policy options available to the electorate depends on candidates’ strate-
gic decisions (be it, platform or entry choices). The political failure we uncover is due to the
intermediation by candidates; that is, the nature of representative democracy itself.
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Appendix: Proofs for Section 3
Recall that for each candidate J , a pure strategy is a mapping xnj :M → {0, 1} (withM = {∅, 0, 1})
and a mixed strategy is denoted by γnJ : {0, 1} × M → ∆[{0, 1}]. For each voter i ∈ N , a
pure strategy is a mapping ani : M × {0, 1}
2 → {φ,A,B} and a mixed strategy is denoted by
τni : {φ,A,B} ×M × {0, 1}
2 → ∆[{∅, A, B}].
Throughout, denote ΠnJ(z; xA, xB) the ex-ante probability that in an electorate of size 2n + 1,
candidate J ∈ {A,B} wins in state z ∈ {0, 1} when candidates propose platforms (xA, xB) ∈
{0, 1}2. Under the assumption, ΠnJ(z; xA, xB) =
1
2
whenever xA = xB. In what follows, in line with
the idea of trembling hand refinements, candidates only consider their opponent’s probability of
mistakes (and not their own since δ < 1/2) when making their platform choice.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let ΓnJ(x; z) := π
(
(1− δ)γnJ (x; z) + δγ
n
J (¬x, z)
)
+ (1− π)
(
(1− δ)γnJ (x; ∅) + δγ
n
J (¬x, ∅)
)
denote the
ex-ante probability that J ∈ {A,B} proposes x in state z. A’s expected payoff from following his
signal m = z and doing the opposite are, respectively
ω
(
ΠnA(z; z,¬z)Γ
n
B(¬z; z) + Γ
n
B(z; z)
1
2
)
− (1− ω) (1− ΠnA(z; z,¬z)) Γ
n
B(¬z; z),
ω
(
ΓnB(¬z; z)
1
2
+ ΠnA(z;¬z, z)Γ
n
B(z; z)
)
− (1− ω)
(
ΓnB(¬z; z) + Π
n
A(z;¬z, z)Γ
n
B(z; z)
)
Whenever information aggregation is feasible, lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z; z,¬z) = 1 and lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z;¬z, z) = 0.
So for n large enough, ΠnA(z; z,¬z) ≥ 1/2 ≥ Π
n
A(z;¬z, z) and A prefers to follow his signal. By
symmetry, the claim follows for B.
Proof of Corollary 1
Follows directly from Proposition 1 as divergence requires xA(m) = 0 or xA(m) = 1 form ∈M .
Proof of Proposition 2
We restrict attention to voters’ strategies such that lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z; z,¬z) = 1 and lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z;¬z, z) = 0.
Observe that this is without loss of generality (wlog) since information aggregation would not
be feasible otherwise (in that case, either voters make mistakes conditional on divergence, or
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candidates always converge when uninformed). From Proposition 1, an informed candidate J
must then always follow his signal for n large enough.
Step 1. We first show that information aggregation is feasible if and only if there exists a sequence
of equilibria in which candidates’ strategies satisfy γnJ (0; ∅) = γ
n
−J(1; ∅) = 1 for some J ∈ {A,B}
and n large enough.
Necessity. Suppose that γnJ (0; ∅) ∈ (0, 1). In the limit, given the voter’s strategy, the probability
that the correct policy is chosen (where we simply highlight dependence on n and denote lim
n→∞
γnJ :=
γJ for ease of exposition) is then:
lim
n→∞
Q(n; γ) =1− δ2

 π2 + π(1− π)
(
α(γA(0; ∅) + γB(0; ∅)) + (1− α)(γA(1; ∅) + γB(1; ∅))
)
+(1− π)2
(
αγA(0; ∅)γB(0; ∅) + (1− α)γA(1; ∅)γB(1; ∅)
)


− δ(1− δ)

 (1− π)2
(
γA(1; ∅)γB(0; ∅) + γA(0; ∅)γB(1; ∅)
)
+π(1− π)
(
α(γA(1; ∅) + γB(1; ∅)) + (1− α)(γA(0; ∅) + γB(0; ∅))
)


− (1− δ)2
(
αγA(1; ∅)γB(1; ∅) + (1− α)γA(0; ∅)γB(0; ∅)
)
Unless αγA(1; ∅)γB(1; ∅)+(1−α)γA(0; ∅)γB(0; ∅) = 0, there exists ǫ > 0 such that limn→∞Q(n; γ) <
1 − ǫ for all δ > 0. Hence, information aggregation requires: (i) γA(0; ∅)γB(0; ∅) = 0 and (ii)
γA(1; ∅)γB(1; ∅) = (1−γA(0; ∅))(1−γB(0; ∅)) = 0. The two conditions are satisfied simultaneously
only if γJ(0; ∅) = γ−J(1; ∅) = 1 for some J ∈ {A,B}.
Sufficiency. Consider candidates’ strategy profile (xA(m), xB(m)) = (I{m=1}, I{m6=0}). In this case,
lim
n→∞
Q(n; γ) = 1− πδ2 − (1− π)δ(1− δ). Observe that πδ2 + (1− π)δ(1− δ) is strictly increasing
with δ (since δ < 1/2). Hence, for all ǫ > 0, there exists a unique δ(ǫ) > 0 such that for all
δ ∈ (0, δ(ǫ)), lim
n→∞
Q(n; γ) > 1− ǫ. Hence, information aggregation is feasible.
Step 2. As a second step, we establish that there exists a sequence of equilibria in which can-
didates’ strategy γnJ (0; ∅) = γ
n
−J(1; ∅) = 1 for some J ∈ {A,B} is individually rational for all
δ ∈ (0, δ0) for some δ0 > 0 and n large enough if and only if Equation 3 holds. Wlog, assume that
xnA(∅) = 0. Recall that Γ
n
J(x; z) is the ex-ante probability that J ∈ {A,B} chooses x in state z.
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Candidate A’s (IC) when uninformed is:
α


ΓnB(0; 0)Π
n
A(0; 0, 0)ω + Γ
n
B(1; 0)Π
n
A(0; 0, 1)ω
−ΓnB(1; 0)(1− Π
n
A(0; 0, 1))(1− ω)

+ (1− α)


ΓnB(0; 1)
(
ΠnA(1; 0, 0)ω − (1− ω)
)
+ΓnB(1; 1)Π
n
A(1; 0, 1)(2ω − 1)


≥ α


ΓnB(0; 0)Π
n
A(0; 1, 0)(2ω − 1)
+ΓnB(1; 0)
(
ΠnA(0; 1, 1)ω − (1− ω)
)

+ (1− α)


ΓnB(0; 1)
(
ΠnA(1; 1, 0)− (1− ω)
)
+ΓnB(1; 1)Π
n
A(1; 1, 1)ω

 (4)
Under our assumption, ΠnA(z; x, x) = 1/2. Further, our restriction on voters’ strategy implies
lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z; z,¬z) = 1 and lim
n→∞
ΠnA(z;¬z, z) = 0 for z ∈ {0, 1} as n → ∞. Denote lim
n→∞
ΓnJ := ΓJ ,
Equation 4 becomes:
αω
(
1−
ΓB(0; 0)
2
)
+ (1− α)(1− ΓB(1; 1))
(ω
2
− (1− ω)
)
≥ α(1− ΓB(0; 0))
(ω
2
− (1− ω)
)
+ (1− α)ω
(
1−
ΓB(1; 1)
2
)
Given B’s strategy, ΓB(1; 1) = 1− δ and ΓB(0; 0) = π+ (1− 2π)δ so the (IC) can be rewritten as:
ω
(
1
2
− α
)
≤ (1− ω)α(1− π) + δ
(ω
2
(1− α)− (1− ω)
(
α(1− 2π) + (1− α)
))
(5)
Notice that if Equation 5 holds, it can be checked that a candidate B has no incentive to deviate
after mB = ∅ since he proposes the ex-ante more likely policy.
We now show that Equation 3 implies that Equation 5 holds for small enough δ. We need to
consider two cases. First, suppose that ω
2
(1 − α) − (1 − ω)
(
α(1 − 2π) + (1 − α)
)
≥ 0. Hence,
if Equation 3 holds, Equation 5 is satisfied for all δ > 0. Second, suppose that ω
2
(1 − α) − (1 −
ω)
(
α(1 − 2π) + (1 − α)
)
< 0. Then Equation 3 implies that there exists δ0 > 0 such that for all
δ ∈ (0, δ0], Equation 5 holds.
Proof of Corollary 2
Direct from observation of the necessary and sufficient condition in the text of Proposition 2 given
α < 1/2. 
To prove our next result, we focus on voter-symmetric voting strategies (and thus drop the subscript
i from voters’ strategies). Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), we denote by σnz,x(τ) the
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probability that a randomly drawn voter votes for policy x ∈ {0, 1} in state z ∈ {0, 1} as a function
of the uninformed voters’ strategy τ . We further denote by σnJ (z; xA, xB) the probability that a
randomly drawn voter votes for J ∈ {A,B} in state z as a function of candidates’ platforms
(xA, xB) ∈ {0, 1}
2. We also denote β(m, xA, xB) ∈ (0, 1) the posterior that the state is z = 0 after
observing message m ∈ M and platforms (xA, xB) ∈ {0, 1}
2. Finally, let Πn :=
(1−(1−pφ)q)
2n+1
2
. A
preliminary Lemma states that the swing voter’s curse holds in this setting. In a voter-symmetric
equilibrium, uninformed voters abstain for n large enough.
Lemma 1. Suppose xA 6= xB. For all β(∅, (xA, xB)) ∈ (0, 1), there exists n
φ(β) such that for all
n > nφ(β), the unique voter-symmetric equilibrium features uninformed voters abstaining.
Proof. The proof follows closely the proofs of Proposition 1, Lemma 1.A and Proposition 3.(iii)
in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, p. 421-22). Without loss of generality, suppose xA = 0 and
xB = 1. The probabilities that a citizen makes a correct decision in states z = 0 and z = 1 are,
respectively:
σn0,0(τ) =σ
n
A(0; 0, 1) = (1− pφ)(q + (1− q)τ
n(A; ∅, 0, 1))
σn1,1(τ) =σ
n
B(1; 0, 1) = (1− pφ)(q + (1− q)τ
n(B; ∅, 0, 1))
In turn, the probabilities of an incorrect vote in states z = 0 and z = 1 are, respectively:
σn0,1(τ) =σ
n
B(0; 0, 1) = (1− pφ)(1− q)τ
n(B; ∅, 0, 1)
σn1,0(τ) =σ
n
A(1; 0, 1) = (1− pφ)(1− q)τ
n(A; ∅, 0, 1)
As in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), σnx,x(τ) = σ
n
¬x,x(τ) + q(1 − pφ). Let Eu(x|m; xA, xB, τ
n)
be the expected utility associated with voting for the candidate committing to x ∈ (xA, xB) or
abstaining, in which case x = φ, conditional on (i) message m, (ii) candidates’ platforms (xA, xB),
and (iii) uninformed citizens’ strategy profile τn.
We can thus use the proof of Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s Proposition 1 in Fey and Kim (2002)
(simply replacing α with the posterior β(∅, (xA, xB))) to establish that Eu(0|∅; 0, 1, τ
n) = Eu(1|∅; 0, 1, τn)
⇒ Eu(φ|∅; 0, 1, τn) > Eu(0|∅; 0, 1, τn). Further, if there exists ε > 0 such that σn¬x,x(τ)−σ
n
x,¬x(τ) >
ε, then there exists n∅(β) such that for all n ≥ n∅(β) Eu(¬x|∅; 0, 1, τn) > Eu(φ|∅; 0, 1, τn) >
Eu(x|∅; 0, 1, τn) (Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s Lemma 1.A). Finally, using a similar logic as in the
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proof of Feddersen and Pesendorfer’s Proposition 3.(iii) for n ≥ n∅(β) we obtain that abstention
is a dominant strategy so τn(φ; ∅, 0, 1) = 1.
Proof of Corollary 3
Observe that due to probability δ of mistake, uninformed voters’ belief satisfies β(∅; xA, xB) ∈ (0, 1)
for all xA, xB such that xA 6= xB for all candidates’ strategy. Hence, by Lemma 1, for all n ≥ n
∅(β),
with n∅(β) finite, uninformed voters abstain. This implies that for n large enough, informed
candidates follow their signal in any equilibrium (using a similar reasoning as in the proof of
Proposition 1). We now show that for n large enough, under the condition of the corollary,
uninformed candidates converge to 1. From the proof of Proposition 2, for n large enough, it is
individually rational for uninformed A to propose xnA(∅) = 1 even if B’s choice when uninformed
satisfies xnB(∅) = 1 with probability one (if γ
n
B(1; ∅) < 1, the electoral benefit of proposing 1 is
higher and the policy cost lower for A). By symmetry, it is individually rational for B to propose
xnB(∅) = 1 even if γ
n
A(1; ∅) = 1.
Hence, there exists a unique sequence of equilibria in which the equilibrium probability that the
policy implemented matches the state satisfies:
lim
n→∞
Q(n) =π2(1− δ2) + 2π(1− π)
(
α(1− δ(1− δ)) + (1− α)(1− δ2)
)
+ (1− π)2
(
α(1− (1− δ)2) + (1− α)(1− δ2)
)
=1− δ2((1− α) + π2α)− 2δ(1− δ)π(1− π)α− (1− δ)2(1− π)2α
Denote H(π) = (1− π)(1− δ)2 − πδ2 − (1− 2π)δ(1− δ) and observe that lim
n→∞
∂Q(n)/∂π has the
same sign as H(π). Notice that H ′(π) < 0 and H(1) = δ(1 − 2δ) > 0 (since δ < 1/2). Hence
lim
n→∞
∂QS(n)/∂π > 0 as claimed.
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